Replies to Critics by Venturinha, Nuno
© LOGOS & EPISTEME, XI, 4 (2020), 527-542 
REPLIES TO CRITICS 
Nuno VENTURINHA 
 
ABSTRACT: This text brings together replies to three commentaries on my 
Description of Situations: An Essay in Contextualist Epistemology (Springer, 
2018) written by Modesto Gómez-Alonso, Anna Boncompagni and Marcin 
Lewiński.  
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1. Reply to Gómez-Alonso 
Modesto Gómez-Alonso’s commentary provides a remarkable overview of my 
main lines of argument in Description of Situations.1 As he stresses right at the 
beginning of his text, I am not interested in epistemic contextualism to place all the 
emphasis, as many others do, on the social dependency of our knowledge claims 
and the relativism that is often associated with such a perspective. My interest in 
contextualist epistemology lies, quite differently, in connecting what is necessarily 
context-sensitive with an objectivity that must be presupposed if we wish to have a 
realist view of the world. Our daily practices clearly show that we are realists 
through and through, but one of the most vexing outcomes of philosophical 
analysis is how realism can vanish so quickly. On the one hand, the fact that our 
knowledge attributions are context-dependent seems to leave no room for any 
reality other than the physical reality behind our language drills. On the other 
hand, the recognition that subjectivity plays a decisive role in the constitution of 
experience brings to light sceptical worries which are by no means easy to 
overcome. Interestingly enough, contextualists argue that scepticism can be 
surpassed if we assume that epistemic standards simply vary according to the 
situations at stake. The high demand for certainty that takes place in the context of 
a philosophy class to illustrate the sceptic’s view actually contrasts with the relaxed 
standards we usually make use of to know the very same things. Notwithstanding 
this ingeniously pragmatic response to the problem of scepticism, there is a specific 
aspect of the problem that contextualism cannot cope with: modality. This is at the 
core of radical scepticism. 
                                                        
1 Nuno Venturinha, Description of Situations: An Essay in Contextualist Epistemology (Cham: 
Springer, 2018). 
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As Gómez-Alonso observes, all my effort in Description of Situations was to 
guarantee, in his apt words, “that the closure of knowledge and the openness of 
experience are compatible.” It leaves me epistemologically uneasy that my typing 
these remarks here and now will not constitute a state of affairs that forms part of 
the world and exists independently of my knowing it. That is what “closure of 
knowledge” in this context is about. Regardless of there being no one else around 
in my room capable of noticing this state of affairs, it must belong to the history of 
the world. Everything that is now happening without being noticed by anyone also 
belongs to what is called in the book a “depository” of states of affairs. Of course, 
by arguing this way, I am left with the complicated job of explaining where this 
depository has its headquarters and how on earth it relates to individual 
consciousness. The variety of individual representations is just what promotes the 
“openness of experience” Gómez-Alonso refers to. David Lewis said he was a realist 
about possible worlds.2 Well, I am a realist about actual states of affairs. I guess the 
majority of physicists would say: “We all are!” Still, this is of little help to convince 
some anti-realist philosophers. 
Gómez-Alonso claims that much of Description of Situations was “inspired 
by a non-dualistic reading of Kant” in regard to cognition. I do, in fact, devote the 
entire Chapter 9 to his transcendentalism but I would not go that far. Gómez-
Alonso also claims that I subscribe, in a McDowellian way, to “the discursivity 
thesis” and he then proposes another non-dualistic approach, one in which we 
would have an “original form of consciousness, one the ‘knowledge’ of which is 
intuitive (non-discursive) and immediate.” According to Gómez-Alonso, this can 
be taken “not as an alternative but as complementary to Venturinha’s method.” Let 
us see if it works. 
Gómez-Alonso introduces an important distinction, “the distinction 
between contextual and trans-contextual truths (and facts),” and also speaks about 
“perspectival and trans-perspectival truths.” The realm of the “trans-contextual” or 
the “trans-perspectival” would be that of a possible world which does not need to 
be made actual by a given context or perspective. As Gómez-Alonso notes, this 
“helps to accommodate objectivity, at least in the sense that trans-perspectival 
truths are analogous to transcendental rules.” But he keenly recognizes that in the 
eyes of a “metaphysical realist” what is at stake is the very fact of reality. As an 
advocate of metaphysical realism, I do not think that trans-contextualism or trans-
perspectivism is required to explain that, for instance, my cellar comprises such 
and such wines, which are at such and such a stage of bottle development, etc. It 
could be argued, however, that this realistic assumption is possible because it is 
                                                        
2 David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 1–5. 
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made by me, who already knows the bottles and can represent them. But what 
about that which has never been experienced at all? I would not say that it belongs 
to a possible world. My view is that it is as actual as the objects I have before me. 
Indeed, I go as far as to claim that any unknown situation is ontologically context-
determined. It does not matter whether the context of reality can be captured by 
us. No doubt it will not be entirely captured. But when we capture some aspect of 
it, this cannot be the result of our situated knowledge. What is happening with my 
bottles, including those processes I am completely ignorant about, is happening in 
our actual world. If I came to learn some of those processes, I would be in a 
condition to make knowledge claims that are context-sensitive, though my 
context-sensitivity should be taken as subordinated to that of reality itself. Gómez-
Alonso is aware of what it means to hold this position. That is why he cuttingly 
writes that “it is this notion of reality in itself that makes radical scepticism not 
only possible, but also intractable.” What a philosophical misadventure that it is 
the most forceful realist who opens the door to the radical sceptic! 
How then can scepticism arise? What can lead us to cast doubts about things 
which it seems so natural for us to take for granted? Gómez-Alonso avers that 
“Venturinha’s crucial insight is that far from being conjunctively related, 
sensitivity and conceptual awareness are internally related in human cognition,” in 
such a way that “it is rational activity that is the special way in which we humans 
are responsive to external reality.” Gómez-Alonso’s strategy, as indicated above, is 
to conceive of this “sensitivity” as something that is not rationally absorbed, but 
has a life of its own. In order to render this mechanism possible, it must be 
“grounded in a sort of primitive, foundational, factive awareness,” he says. I 
absolutely agree. The problem with this view is that “awareness” only springs from 
an individual who already integrates the given in his or her subjectivity. One 
might say—and I would fully endorse it—“What I’m aware of is real.” But this will 
not detain the sceptic. I should point out that this sceptic is not some baffling 
creature that philosophers are prone to allude to. The most impetuous sceptic is 
obviously an uncondescending interlocutor who, like Wittgenstein’s imaginary 
opponent in the Philosophical Investigations, can be found in ourselves. Gómez-
Alonso suggests, following Ernest Sosa’s lead, a kind of “constitutive awareness” 
which, more than representing reality, presents it. Despite its practical aptitude, 
the “immediate identity of subject and object of awareness” that is required by this 
form of intentionality would be no less problematic than Husserlian 
phenomenology is—and Gómez-Alonso has a note reminding the reader of my 
worries about it in Chapter 10 of the book. What does he recommend? That 
“conceptual awareness” be thought of as involving “spontaneity and constraint,” 
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with the latter being the necessary imposition of the world upon our cognitive 
capacities. Somewhat like Kant, we could say that: “Thoughts [viz. spontaneous 
acts] without content are empty, intuitions [viz. constraints] without concepts are 
blind.”3 However, it is not exactly so since Gómez-Alonso argues that “the 
transcendental disunity of the self [would be] a necessary condition for the 
possibility of self-awareness.” While in Kant an intuition can only be given 
according to a transcendental scheme, the domain of what can constrain us would 
have to be completely de-transcendentalized in order to avoid any kind of 
idealism. But Gómez-Alonso knows that we are inexorably tied to “the universal 
configuration of thought and awareness” and that in the end “nothing in thought 
comes from the outside.” This is what fuels the modal problem in Kant, as I explain 
in Chapter 9 of the book. 
My struggle against the correspondence theory of truth, including the 
Kantian one, in Chapter 3 was precisely meant as an attempt to de-subjectivize 
such “universal configuration.” The epistemological programme of Description of 
Situations makes traditional correspondism implode to give way to reality, which 
determines the multiple possible accesses to it—including our own. Herein lies my 
interest in Wittgensteinian “hinge epistemology” that Gómez-Alonso also 
discusses. Following Duncan Pritchard, I see hinges as “arational commitments”4 
that manifest—not only for us, rational beings, but for a number of other 
animals—the primacy of the real. They somehow occupy the place left by the 
Tractarian elementary propositions consisting of ultimate ontological links with 
the world. Without those hinges, there would be no connection between inner and 
outer, no possibility of forming higher-order beliefs like those we have. They are 
thus the best weapon against scepticism. For the anti-realist interpreter of 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, hinges will simply point to what in a certain 
linguistic milieu of social practices came to be more or less naturally 
conventioned—therefore leaving the sceptical problem unresolved. In a different 
way, I take hinges to be the primary contextual factors that situate us in 
experience. Gómez-Alonso’s conclusion is that our “feeling of reality” should be 
accorded a special status, that of an “ultimate fact,” which, to use Kant’s jargon, 
                                                        
3 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, edited and translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W. 
Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), B 75. 
4 Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of our 
Believing (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 71. 
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will correspond neither to “matters of opinion” nor to “facts” (of knowledge) but 
merely to “matters of belief.”5 The same, I am convinced, can be said of hinges. 
2. Reply to Boncompagni 
The focus of Anna Boncompagni’s insightful commentary is the conflict between 
fallibilism and infallibilism, more specifically my “endorsement of a form of 
infallibilism.” In opposition to the Lewis-inspired epistemological approach I take 
in Description of Situations, Boncompagni sets out to defend the coherence of a 
fallibilist view such as articulated by Stewart Cohen. As she puts it, “claiming that 
we know something and at the same time acknowledging that it still might turn 
out that we are wrong is not only possible, but pretty common.” Boncompagni 
illustrates this by mentioning those cases in which we reflect upon our previous 
epistemic position and realize that “we thought we knew something,” even if there 
was a justification for thinking so, when after all “we actually were wrong.” 
Let me begin by making two comments on this. The first is that there is an 
important difference between recognizing that we could be wrong about what we 
claim to know and realizing in retrospect that we were under the illusion of 
knowing it. I can be very much convinced that I know a multitude of things and 
still leave room for reconsideration. What happens in this case is that my 
presumptive knowledge will remain in force unless it is proven otherwise. This is 
completely different from arriving at the conclusion that my knowing this or that 
was in fact a mere presumption of knowledge. So where does fallibilism fit here? 
On the one hand, if the fallibilist’s point is to underscore that we could always be 
wrong, including about what remains unshaken, then the outcome is not so much 
that our knowledge is fallible but revisable. Some epistemologists make no 
distinction between fallible and revisable knowledge, but it is one thing to affirm 
that knowledge can be defective or unreliable and quite another thing to say it can 
be subject to revision. On the other hand, if the fallibilist wants to stress that our 
knowledge has already been proved erroneous sometimes, and will probably be so 
again, then fallible knowledge would be identifiable only retrospectively. Thus, it 
does not seem to make much sense to be a fallibilist since either you conjecture 
that you may well be mistaken about your knowledge claims, while nevertheless 
maintaining them, or you simply admit that you were wrong about certain things, 
                                                        
5 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, edited by Paul Guyer; translated by Paul 
Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 467. 
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but now you know them.6 In other words, either fallible knowledge is projected as 
possibly being the case in the future or it is projected as having been the case in the 
past—it is never a reality in the present. As an epistemological program, fallibilism 
is a mere expression of suspicion, which can sit more comfortably with 
revisionism. 
My second comment concerns the kind of revisability involved in a falliblist 
view. The diagnosis made by the fallibilist that our knowledge is fallible—more 
accurately, that it can be or was fallible—does not apply to the generality of the 
things we know but to particular elements of our worldview. We can revise some 
of these elements, for example that Italian is not the only official language in Italy 
and that German is also spoken in the autonomous province of South Tyrol. In 
doing so, we look at our previous claim not as faulty but as incomplete. Even if we 
could be utterly wrong about something, like proponents of geocentrism were 
until the imposition of heliocentrism as the correct astronomical model, there 
cannot be a collapse of all aspects belonging to that picture. Not everything in the 
Ptolemaic model was evidently discarded. Copernicus kept the idea that the orbits 
of the planets were perfectly circular, although they would be found to be 
elliptical, but he also kept many other concepts, definitions, presuppositions, etc. 
This basis that must be inevitably assumed by everyone—common man, 
philosopher or scientist—is incompatible with an understanding of knowledge as 
essentially fallible because it is the starting point for any practice. Boncompagni 
mentions with approval a paper by Keith DeRose in which he distinguishes 
between “intuitive fallibilism,” the “sensible” perspective put forward by Cohen, 
and “GC-fallibilism,” the “genuine conflict” or, as DeRose also describes it, the “real 
conflict between the likes of ‘I know that p’ and ‘It’s possible that not-pind’” 
identified by Lewis and which led him to adopt an infallibilist stance.7 But I think 
that DeRose’s survey of the various ways in which we can consider this conflict 
does not do justice to Lewis’ perceptive account of the inconsistency of fallibilism.8 
I shall try to explain why. 
                                                        
6 A fully fledged fallibilist will want to admit that she may be continuously mistaken about any 
of her knowledge claims, but she has to stop somewhere under pain of becoming a radical 
sceptic. 
7 Keith DeRose, “Contextualism and Fallibilism,” in The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic 
Contextualism, ed. J.J. Ichikawa (London: Routledge, 2017), 145–155, repr. as Appendices E and 
F in The Appearance of Ignorance: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Volume 2 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2017), 287. As DeRose explains (ibid., 286, note 7), “pind” expresses the 
indicative mood that is necessary to keep. 
8 See the aforementioned Appendix F, in which Lewis’ name is not even mentioned.  
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The problem is not that a subject S often fails to provide a reason r or an 
evidence e to holding p as true, assuming that r or e should entail p and that 
infallible knowledge would correspond to such entailment. Since we can never be 
sure about the completeness of r or e, this entailment conception of infallibilism, as 
Cohen rightly saw, leads to an “immediate skeptical result.”9 However, contrary to 
Cohen’s conclusion, the solution cannot be found by reverting to fallibilism for this 
can also lead to scepticism. Susan Haack, for instance, has shown that it is 
reasonable to think that, “on an epistemological interpretation,” a fallibilist view 
“collapses into scepticism.”10 She sums up her take on this issue more judiciously as 
follows: 
(…) if we distinguish strong and weak accounts of knowledge, according as the 
warrant for a belief to count as knowledge must be infallible or merely good [viz. 
fallible], and hence weak scepticism (we have no strong [viz. infallible] 
knowledge) and strong scepticism (we have no weak [viz. fallible] knowledge), 
then fallibilism entails weak but not—not so far as the present argument goes, 
anyway—strong scepticism.11 
This mitigated or “weak scepticism” that Haack attaches to fallibilism is the 
necessary consequence of her construal of infallibilism as entailing a “strong 
scepticism.” This becomes perhaps clearer if we rewrite Haack’s argument in terms 
of constructive or destructive dilemmas, which are disjunctive forms of modus 
ponens or modus tollens, respectively. Let SK stand for “strong knowledge” and 
WK stand for “weak knowledge,” and let SS stand for “strong scepticism” and WS 
stand for “weak scepticism.” We then get, for example, the following: 
(WS  SS), (WS  SK), (SS  WK) ⊢ (SK  WK) 
which amounts to 
SK  WK 
Or, corresponding more exactly to Haack’s wording:  
(SK  WK), (WS  SK), (SS  WK) ⊢ (WS  SS) 
which amounts to 
                                                        
9 Stewart Cohen, “How to be a Fallibilist,” Philosophical Perspectives 2 (1988): 91–123, here 91. 
DeRose brings this view into question arguing that “‘infallibilism,’ as Cohen is construing it, does 
not actually by itself doom us to skepticism,” but he concedes that we could have a sceptical 
outcome if it were “combined with some restrictive account of what our reasons or evidence 
might be” (The Appearance of Ignorance, 285). 
10 Susan Haack, “Fallibilism and Necessity,” Synthese 41 (1979): 37–63, here 49. 
11 Ibid., 56. 
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WS  SS 
If we now replace SK with I, for infallibilism, and WK with F, for fallibilism, 
we get in the first case: 
(WS  SS), (WS  I), (SS  F) ⊢ (I  F) 
which should be equivalent to 
(WS  SS), (WS  F), (SS  I) ⊢ (F  I) 
And in the second case we get: 
(I  F), (WS  I), (SS  F) ⊢ (WS  SS) 
which again should be equivalent to 
(I  F), (WS  F), (SS  I) ⊢ (WS  SS) 
The problem with these arguments is that the construal of I as F and F as 
I would make the consequents of the implications collapse into the same element 
alternating between its affirmation and negation and thus failing to form a proper 
dilemma. And of course we could also construe SS as the reverse of WS and WS as 
the reverse of SS. I think this is not the best way to deal with the question and that 
it is wrong to postulate that infallibilism entails “strong scepticism.” Lewis calls our 
attention to the inexorability of taking to be true what is epistemologically vital for 
us in each context, and that is why, in his view, an infallibilist conception of 
knowledge is the best antidote against scepticism. This is also the reason why 
Lewis regards both fallibilism and scepticism as “mad,”12 a view that, as pointed out 
in Description of Situations, echoes that propounded by Wittgenstein in On 
Certainty. This brings me to the central criticism made by Boncompagni in her 
commentary.  
Although she admits that “the indubitability of hinges is often stressed by 
Wittgenstein” and that, according to On Certainty, “to make a mistake about our 
basic assumptions, presuppositions or beliefs would look like a mental disturbance 
rather than a mere error,” Boncompagni regards Wittgenstein as a pragmatist much 
in the spirit of Peirce. She is therefore happy to accept that On Certainty involves a 
contextualist analysis—one that Boncompagni also identifies in pragmatism—but 
she rejects the infallibilism I see attached to contextualism. Boncompagni 
highlights Peirce’s “indubitables,” which consist of “perceptual judgments, acritical 
                                                        
12 David Lewis, “Elusive Knowledge,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1996): 549–567, 
repr. in Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 418–445, here 419. 
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inferences, and original beliefs” that, contrary to the present evidence, could turn 
out to be false in the future. Their indubitable character does not result from a self-
evident truth but rests instead on the necessity prompted by the situation which 
we are in. The pragmatist corollary is that our knowledge “is fallible even on 
indubitables,” which are so only because we need them to be like this in the course 
of our various practices. The regularities we find in experience are in the end 
pragmatically justified. However, and this is an important caveat, Boncompagni 
considers that this applies to Wittgenstein only partially. She recognizes that, 
unlike Peirce, Wittgenstein traces “a categorical distinction between hinges and 
ordinary beliefs,” arguing that “the indubitability of hinges is logical, not 
empirical.” But, in her view, this does not eclipse “a form of fallibilism” that can be 
found in Wittgenstein. I will conclude by saying why I disagree. 
Boncompagni quotes §§ 424 and 425 of On Certainty where, at the very end, 
Wittgenstein states that he cannot be mistaken about his own name nonetheless 
adding: “that does not mean that I am infallible [unfehlbar] about it.”13 But I do not 
see this as a capitulation to fallibilism—nor does Boncompagni see it that way. No 
one, except a child or a demented person, can be mistaken about their name, the 
name they are called by, which they use to be identified, etc. If I suddenly found 
out that I had been adopted, that my real name was different, I would certainly 
suffer some emotional disorder, but I could easily accommodate in my worldview 
that I had been given another name when I was born and identify “N. V.” with 
whatever that name was. As said above, I look at these kinds of cases as properly 
falling within a revisionism that we obviously need to tolerate. Boncompagni will 
say that I am then a fallibilist, but I am not. If I had been given another name at 
birth, I would not cease to be called “N. V.” and would not regard this name as 
involving a Fehler, a “mistake.” Similarly, if I disliked the name given by my 
parents and were to take another name, someone who called me “N. V.” would not 
be at all mistaken. Not only witnesses but also my documents would state that I 
had indeed used that name. In addition, those who thought that my name was “N. 
V.,” unaware that I had taken another name, would not be mistaken about what a 
man is, a first and a family name are, the role an identity plays in society, the 
world human beings belong to, etc. It is exactly this network of presumptions that 
is at the heart of Wittgenstein’s—and Lewis’—infallibilism. The emphasis put on 
the systematic nature of our knowledge allows revisability but only in the interior 
of that system, which as such can never be considered fallible. What most 
fallibilists fail to see is that their reservations about the knowledge we have are 
                                                        
13 Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, Revised edition by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von 
Wright, translated by Denis Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), § 425. 
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either amenable to our revision, leaving the infallibilist perfectly happy, or collide 
with the systemic structure of belief formation, and this is where people like 
Wittgenstein and Lewis enter the scene. What they say is that this second kind of 
reservation, which results in a sceptical argumentation, is in fact inoperative since 
it is logically incoherent. It is only from a theoretical point of view that it seems 
possible to doubt that I have a body or that the Earth already existed long before 
my birth. From a practical point of view, a fallibility about this is immediately 
undercut. As a pragmatist, Boncompagni does not contest this. The fallibilism she 
finds in On Certainty is more subtle. Let me end by sketching out her view and 
how the infallibilism I defend responds to it. 
Boncompagni argues that, even contrary to all evidence, “it still might turn 
out, for some unexpected reasons, that we failed,” and she gives some examples for 
possible cases of epistemological failure: trees that I have always seen as trees could 
after all be pictures or holograms; a landslide could occur while I was sleeping and 
after waking up my front door could suddenly open onto a ravine; or the registered 
spelling of my name could be different to what its correct spelling has always been 
for me. Boncompagni’s point is that experience itself can invalidate our deepest 
beliefs. “The physical possibility of a failure of knowledge remains open,” she says. 
Boncompagni does not suggest these possibilities of error urge us to adopt a 
sceptical attitude. Her perspective is that they by no means affect “the objective 
certainty and the instinctive trust” that our praxis requires. However, these 
possibilities are there and, so she thinks, we cannot eschew them. As a 
consequence, “we cannot claim that our knowledge is infallible.” Boncompagni 
anticipates that, within the framework of my contextualist perspective, such 
possibilities are excluded insofar as they are irrelevant alternatives to our current 
situation. But I am arguing for an infallibilist view that goes beyond “relevant 
alternatives” theories.14 If I know that I have a magnolia tree in my garden, that I 
have planted and watered it, why should I be a fallibilist about “the tree that I have 
seen here my whole life long,” to use Boncompagni’s own words, unless I was a 
radical sceptic? How can it “eventually disclos[e] as something different (say, a 
picture, or a hologram)” and still fit into a situation that can be depicted? It is 
noteworthy that she is not referring to some tree that I just saw at a distance, 
which could for instance belong to a film studio facility, but to one I am fully 
acquainted with. The same impossibility of depicting the situation is present in her 
example of the landslide. First, it is highly implausible that if there were a landslide 
                                                        
14 I elaborate on this theme in a critical notice of Jessica Brown’s Fallibilism: Evidence and 
Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), which is mentioned by Boncompagni. See 
Nuno Venturinha, “Non-sceptical Infallibilism,” Analysis 80 (2020): 186–195, esp. 189–191. 
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one night I would not wake up. Second, the possibility of encountering a ravine 
when opening my front door next morning is only an admissible possibility if my 
house is built on a steep slope. There are thus specific truth-conditions for that 
event. This possibility is empirically cancelled by the geography of the place where 
I live, which is pretty much flat. But anyone living near steep slopes should 
definitely be worried about landslides at night. What these two examples show is 
that they are not, as Boncompagni believes, “concrete possibilities within our 
context,” even if far-fetched or remote. They can represent possibilities of error 
only within some specific contexts—precisely, when they are representable. In all 
other cases they are abstract possibilities that, pace Boncompagni, illustrate how, 
strictly speaking, fallibilism coincides with scepticism. What needs to be 
understood is that it is an entire structure of reasons that leads us to ponder the 
possibility of being erroneous. The third example given by Boncompagni, the 
possible misspelling of my name when confronted with official records, does not 
convince me either of the merits of fallibilism. I could discover that my surname 
was actually spelled with an accent and I would try to figure out why in my 
documents, since I remember them, it appears without a diacritic. But I do not 
think that this should be sufficient to say that I was mistaken about my name. I 
would wonder why in the documents I saw my father’s name was also spelled 
without an accent and try to find a plausible explanation for this. Orthographies 
change, clerks are sometimes careless—these would be good explanations. Again, 
this is at best a revisable matter, not something by which we would be 
epistemologically enhanced by being fallibilists. 
My conclusion is that, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, there is 
not too much difference between my infallibilism and Boncompagni’s fallibilism. 
What I emphasize is the problematic closeness between fallibilism and scepticism, 
which, so far as I can see, only an infallibilist take on knowledge and justification 
can break. 
3. Reply to Lewiński 
Marcin Lewiński’s commentary raises an array of interesting points from the 
perspective of pragmatics in the midst of which the social dimension of language, 
with all its performativity, is decisive. Even though the context-sensitivity 
defended in Description of Situations is at the core of a pragmatic approach, there 
should be little surprise that a performative outlook is hardly reconcilable with the 
epistemological objectivism I pursue. Therefore, the challenges posed by Lewiński 
gain special importance because he presses my arguments from a totally different 
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angle than the other commentators. In what follows, I shall try to accommodate 
the chief worries of a pragmatic position within my account. 
Lewiński’s starting point coincides with the way I open Description of 
Situations. My sentence “I am working at a table” is meant to throw the reader into 
a situation, analogous to the multiple situations in which we get involved, and lead 
this reader to realize what is epistemologically implied in the words we use in that 
particular context. The narrative of Description of Situations is strategically 
oriented around a subject who happens to be me but is supposed to mirror the 
access anyone has to the world. At every moment, we condense the reality before 
us into a coherent whole. Each one, equipped with their own background, 
constantly forms a view of tiny pieces abstractedly cut out from the bulk of 
experience. These varied pieces do not stand apart from each other but are linked 
in what is typically called awareness or consciousness. More than just being 
individuals who construct their personal identity over time, we fill the entire 
surrounding space with a wide range of conceptualizations—cultural, political, 
religious, scientific, etc. This, however, is not easy to discern in our regular 
activities and one mode of grasping the causal mechanisms that constitute these 
events is to decompose them into situations, which are only accessed by means of 
propositions. Describing situations amounts to nothing more than analysing 
ordinary propositions.  
The main difficulty with describing a situation is that it is essentially 
blurred. We refer to specific situations but their contours are barely 
distinguishable. Situations overlap each other. They are never completely closed in 
themselves but constantly integrate new aspects and evolve in an unpredictable 
way. Moreover, their content is not made up only of objects but actions and 
relations play a fundamental role too. Drinking, raining, smiling are all actions of 
possible situations which, alone, could never create an actual situation. Many other 
elements are required to describe, for example, that two people are on a date—say, 
an elegant bar where they drink some fancy cocktails, on a romantic rainy night, 
while they smile at each other. Situations are thus made of continuous saturated 
frames and composed of various conceptual elements that are not exclusive to the 
situation at stake. In addition, like Aristotelian substances, situations possess their 
accidents, which can themselves be turned into new substances, or sub-situations, 
depending on our angle of analysis or recognition. The amount of drink that at a 
certain time is in each of the glasses form a sub-situation of the main situation of 
the two people dating. Where, then, does one situation end and another begin so 
that we can refer to completely different situations even using some of the same 
words, such as drinking coffee at breakfast, driving when it is raining or half 
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smiling politely? It is here that context enters. Contexts are inherently 
epistemological. The people in the bar could be doing many things other than 
dating. They could be chatting, conspiring, doing business. But they could not be 
making parachute jumps, orbiting around the Earth or sailing. Lewiński asks why 
someone should interpret, as I do, my working at a table as writing philosophy 
when it could be interpreted in so many different ways. Indeed it can, but what I 
try to underscore is that any interpretation must be contextually acceptable, 
therefore excluding a whole set of interpretations which, being possible states of 
affairs in the world, do not ontologically fit in the situation. It is precisely due to 
this paramount contextual definition that the processing of possibilities does not go 
on indefinitely but is actually limited to a fairly reasonable number of scenarios. 
Without contexts, our brains would be stuck between a logical sum“p1  p2  p3 
…” (either writing philosophy or tidying up the desk or authorizing a nuclear 
attack or …) and a logical product “q1  q2  q3 …” (neither swimming in the 
pool, nor playing cello, nor hunting the snark nor …).15 I am sure that Lewiński 
will not contest that powerful political leaders could authorize a nuclear attack 
while working at their tables but that an academic is slightly more limited under 
the same circumstances. What he asks then is what kind of description I am 
offering. Is it a “thin” or a “thick” description, in the words of Gilbert Ryle? Am I 
merely concerned with spatiotemporal, behaviouristic descriptions, or is my 
concern the meaning of the situation? 
Lewiński remarks that even though Ryle does not look at the matter exactly 
so, the “thin” descriptions will “largely correspond to what logical empiricists 
would call ‘protocol’ or ‘observation sentences’,” in the sense that they are “directly 
experienced, brute descriptions of empirical reality.” And he immediately goes on 
to quote a passage from Description of Situations, where I mention that “[a]n 
extraordinarily complex interpretation is made at all times and [that] it is through 
this framework that we organize reality,” as an evidence for my emphasis on the 
“thick” descriptions. Lewiński is absolutely right that I am not just interested in 
“thin” descriptions for the simple reason that they alone cannot explain a situation. 
A physicalist description of someone sitting at a table could hardly instruct us 
about what is really happening. What Lewiński does not understand is how I can 
put together the “social ontology” characteristic of “thick” descriptions and 
epistemic objectivism when, for philosophers like John Searle, “the social world is 
ontologically subjective.” Lewiński notes that “[t]he ontologically objective natural 
                                                        
15 To be more exact, none of these possibilities could ever have been considered if the 
calculations of logical sums and products had not stopped at some point determining specific 
notions.     
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world would by contrast exist as well without any human experience, as argued by 
Venturinha too,” but this presumed objectivity is of little epistemological interest if 
it does not inform the social reality. There is in fact a gap between my 
understanding of the objectivist/subjectivist divide and Lewiński’s understanding 
of the same categories. My aim was not to carry out either (i) “objective 
descriptions of the objective, natural world” (I do not work in natural science) or 
(ii) “objective descriptions of the subjective, social world” (I do not work in social 
sciences either). And my aim is definitely far from (iii) “subjective descriptions of 
the objective, natural world” (I am not a realist artist) or (iv) “subjective 
descriptions of the subjective, social world” (I am not telling a story). Lewiński says 
he is unsure about whether I am “clear enough about which type of ‘descriptions of 
situations’” defines my approach. Well, I think the book makes clear that what is at 
issue is, to use Ryle’s own terms, to show how “thick” descriptions are not 
completely dependent on social factors but are, in the end, subordinated to what 
can be captured by some “thin” descriptions. Hence, the description of situations 
that I conduct is different from each of the four types suggested byLewiński, which 
do not take on board the intricacies of our everyday situations. To describe 
situations is not a technical endeavour but something that the common man 
already does at every single moment and that a contextualist epistemology seeks to 
scrutinize. As Lewiński notices, in my book this scrutiny takes the form of a 
description that has its roots in the work of the later Wittgenstein, but here again 
Lewiński fails to take one key aspect into account.  
After quoting a passage from my Preface in which I mention a remark from 
Wittgenstein written on 30 June 1931 and where he identifies “a description of 
nature” with “the description of a situation,”16 Lewiński argues that what this idea 
implies is “a protocol sentence that needs (and allows for) no more than a thin 
description of the ontologically objective world,” adding that “[n]o tricky, socially 
recognizable as something entity is being involved here.” It is indisputable that 
Wittgenstein’s middle or transitional philosophy is very much under the influence 
of both the Tractatus and the Vienna Circle and that only in the Philosophical 
Investigations does Wittgenstein fully open, to use Lewiński’s nice formulation, 
“the Pandora’s box of thick descriptions, descriptions of society.” Nevertheless, it is 
a mistake to consider that when Wittgenstein refers in this remark to “the analysis 
of an ordinary proposition, for example ‘there is a lamp on my table’” and says that 
“we should be able to get everywhere from there,” since such a situation would 
                                                        
16 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Vienna Edition, vol. 3, edited by Michael Nedo (Vienna: Springer, 
1995), MS 110: 243, my translation. 
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contain “the material for all the rest,”17 he has no more than a physicalist 
description in sight. The path that led Wittgenstein to the recognition of the social 
character of language started exactly in the early 1930s, with several remarks from 
this period making their way into the Philosophical Investigations.18 Two remarks 
that would form the core of § 122 of the Investigations, with its crucial notions of 
“surveyable representation” and “intermediate links,” were drafted only a couple of 
days later, on 2 July 1931.19 And the pivotal notion of “language-game”—to which 
Lewiński alludes as a turning point in Wittgenstein’s thought—appears as early as 
1 March 1932.20 More significant than this, however, is the fact that the remark 
from June 1931 mentioned in my Preface is used as a mere motto for an inquiry 
that, apart from some engagement with the Tractatus in Chapters 2 and 3 and 
minor references to other texts, only finds an echo in On Certainty, which is 
central in Chapters 7 and 11—the latter entitled “Social Dependency.” My effort 
was to show that it is possible to read On Certainty as a fundamentally non-
relativist work, with Wittgenstein manoeuvring, to employ Pritchard’s 
terminology, between an understanding of hinges as “arational commitments” or 
“über hinge commitments,” on the one hand, which result in “über hinge 
propositions” that stand by themselves, and “personal hinge commitments,” on the 
other, which result in “personal hinge propositions” framed according to our socio-
cultural world.21 The corollary is an epistemological model that can accommodate 
contextualism within a minimal realism, thus avoiding the relativism and even 
scepticism that standard contextualist approaches—with the notable exception of 
Lewis’ infallibilism—must necessarily admit. I am of course aware that 
pragmaticians tolerate relativism well and that radical scepticism is quite far from 
their list of concerns. But the driving force behind epistemic contextualism has 
always been a reaction to sceptical worries, and Description of Situations should be 
no different. 
I would like to conclude with a general comment on an important concept 
that Lewiński brings to the fore in the final part of his commentary: the concept of 
                                                        
17 Ibid. 
18 See in this regard Nuno Venturinha (ed.), The Textual Genesis of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations (New York: Routledge, 2013). 
19 Wittgenstein, Vienna Edition, vol. 3, MS 110: 257. I take the translations of these notions from 
Philosophical Investigations, Revised fourth edition by P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, 
translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte (Chichester: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2009), § 122. 
20 See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Vienna Edition, vol. 5, edited by Michael Nedo (Vienna: Springer, 
1996), MS 113: 88–89. 
21 See Pritchard, Epistemic Angst, 71 and 95–96. 
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“presumption.” I have already alluded to the notion of “presumptive knowledge” in 
my reply to Boncompagni and it can certainly be fruitfully explored, as Lewiński 
proposes, within the framework of a contextualist epistemology. Presumptions, as 
he accurately observes, “would be the counterpart of defeaters,” which exert a key 
role in contextual analyses by virtue of the conflicting evidence they originate. The 
problem with defeaters is that, as Michael Williams elegantly put it, “the severity 
of standards for knowing is directly proportional to the remoteness of the defeaters 
that command our attention,”22 and thus the appeal to defeasibility seems like a 
never-ending road. Better presumptions than defeaters, for sure. But what I take to 
be the essential feature of presumptive knowledge is very different from what 
Lewiński sees as its main trait: the development of “an intersubjective as-ifness, 
achieved in collective critical testing of claims through public argumentative 
practices.” No doubt this is very much needed in our post-truth society. But, as said 
before, I am interested in the network of presumptions that lie beneath all 
“argumentative discussions” in which we can get involved, the presumptions that 
we can by no means drop regardless of the arguments under discussion. It is this 
space of truth that I consider to be essential and non-negotiable in epistemology.23 
                                                        
22 Michael Williams, “Scepticism and the Context of Philosophy,” Philosophical Issues 14 (2004): 
456–475, here 470. 
23 I am very much indebted to the participants in this book symposium for their thought-
provoking commentaries and to the editor-in-chief of Logos & Episteme, Eugen Huzum, for his 
generosity and interest in my Description of Situations. This work was supported by the 
Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology [grant number UIBD/00183/2020].  
